

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-11

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ACDA-10 PRS-01 SSO-00 INRE-00 TRSE-00 DRC-01 /068 W

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O P 310130Z AUG 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7359

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 4348

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

USMISSION UN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USDOCOSOUTH PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 4706

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT CY GR TU NATO

SUBJ: CYPRUS: AUGUST 30 MEETING OF NATO CYPRUS GROUP

1. CYPRUS GROUP MET AGAIN AUGUST 30 AT CALL OF ACTING SYG PANSA WITH PECK (UK), DE ROSE (FRANCE), KRAPF (FRG), RUMSFELD AND MCAULIFFE (US), BAL (BELGIUM), KILLHAM AND LISSFELT (INTERNATIONAL STAFF) ATTENDING.

2. PANSA REPORTED THAT CHORAFAS (GREECE) HAD PROVIDED HIM LATE ON AUGUST 29 WITH TEXT OF PM KARAMANLIS' AUGUST 28 LETTER TO HEADS OF OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS (ATHENS 6210 NOTAL AND STATE 190075 NOTAL). WHEN MAKING DELIVERY OF INFORMATION COPY FOR SYG LUNS, CHORAFAS EXPLAINED THAT INDENTICAL LETTER HAD GONE TO EACH HEAD OF GOVERNMENT EXCEPT PM ECEVIT. IN TURKISH CASE, GREEK AMBASSADOR ANKARA IS TO CONVEY SUBSTANCE OF LETTER  
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ORALLY TO TURKISH PM OR FONMIN EXCEPT REPEAT EXCEPT PARA 3 OF

KARAMANLIS LETTER ("THE PRESENT TRAGEDY OF CYPRUS RESULTED... PEACE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE WHOLE WORLD") TO WHICH HE

IS TO MAKE NO REFERENCE. CHORAFAS EXPLAINED THAT, IN ADDRESSING LETTERS TO NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, KARAMANLIS IS FOLLOWING PRECEDENT SET BY GENERAL DE GAULLE.

3. WHEN PANSAS QUERIED CHORAFAS AS TO MEANING AND INTENT OF KARAMANLIS LETTER, GREEK AMBASSADOR SAID HE WAS UNINSTRUCTED BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO REPRESENT AN ENLARGEMENT AND FORMALIZATION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT HE HAD MADE IN NAC ON AUGUST 14 (USNATO 4407) WHICH ATHENS HAD DRAFTED HURRIEDLY. CHORAFAS WAS ALSO UNABLE TO SAY WHETHER GOG PLANS TO MAKE PUBLIC EXISTENCE OR TEXT OF KARAMANLIS LETTER.

4. SPEAKING PERSONALLY AND AFTER ONLY QUICK ANALYSIS, PANSAS SAID THREE PASSAGES IN LETTER TROUBLED HIM:

A. PARA 5 - SECOND SENTENCE: "IF THE ALLIANCE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PREVENT AN ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO OF ITS MEMBERS, WOULD IT BE ABLE TO COME TO THEIR SUCCOUR IN THE EVENT OF DANGER FROM OUTSIDE?"

B. PARA 6 - SECOND SENTENCE: "AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS DECISION GREECE SHALL ACQUIRE FORTHWITH OVER HER ENTIRE TERRITORY, AIRSPACE AND TERRITORIAL WATERS FULL EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY..."

C. PARA 8 - THIS PASSAGE CAN BE READ TO MEAN THAT GREECE WILL ASSOCIATE ITSELF ONLY REPEAT ONLY WITH ALLIANCE'S DETENTE EFFORTS.

5. DE ROSE COMMENTED THAT UNTIL NOW NO ALLY HAS EVER QUESTIONED RESOLVE OR ABILITY OF OTHER MEMBERS TO COME TO ITS AID IN EVENT OF EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. HE ADDED THAT VERY FACT THAT WAR BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY HAD NOT ERUPTED DURING 1974 AND EARLIER CYPRUS DISPUTES WAS DUE IN NO SMALL MEASURE TO EXISTENCE OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. DE ROSE ALSO OBSERVED THAT FRANCE PARTICIPATES IN BOTH NADGE AND ACE HIGH COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WHICH IS RATHER DIFFERENT THAN VIEW EXPRESSED IN  
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PARA. 6 OF KARAMANLIS LETTER.

6. PANSAS ASKED WHAT NATO MIGHT DO TO HELP ALLIED GOVERNMENTS IN PREPARING THEIR RESPONSE TO KARAMANLIS LETTER. SPEAKING ON AN ENTIRELY PERSONAL BASIS AND WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, RUMSFELD SAID HE ASSUMES THAT KARAMANLIS FEELS CONSIDERABLE DOMESTIC PRESSURE AND THE NEED TO TAKE ACTION FIRST WITH THE EARLIER PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IN ATHENS AND NOW WITH THIS LETTER TO HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS TO EASE THAT PRESSURE. IT HARDLY SEEMS NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE AT THIS MOMENT TO CLARIFY EVERY PHRASE OR SEEK TO RECONCILE INCONSISTENCIES AND CONTRADICTIONS SINCE GREEKS, WHO MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE CONSIDERED FULL LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES, MAY HAVE DELIBERATELY INTRODUCED AMBIGUITIES TO

ALLOW SELVES ROOM FOR MANEUVER WHILE REDUCING DOMESTIC PRESSURE AND TRYING TO INDUCE ALLIES TO APPLY PRESSURE TO TURKS. RUMSFELD PERSONALLY FELT IT BEST FOR NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF TO ANALYZE KARAMANLIS LETTER CAREFULLY AND OBJECTIVELY TO DETERMINE THOSE POSITIONS WHICH MERIT ATTENTION. ADDITIONALLY IS ANALYSTS MIGHT IDENTIFY VARIOUS NATO LINKS TO GREECE, BREAK THEM INTO SEPARABLE PARTS, CONSIDER HOW AND IN WHAT FORUM THEY MIGHT BE DEALT WITH IN EVENT THAT GOG WISHES CHANGE IN SOME MANNER ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ALLIANCE. SOME ISSUES MIGHT REQUIRE NAC ATTENTION; OTHERS IN DPC PURVIEW; STILL OTHER IN NPG. IS SHOULD DEVOTE THOUGHT TO WHOLE SUBJECT. THERE SEEMS TO BE NO NEED FOR RAPID REACTION, INDEED QUITE THE OPPOSITE.

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7360

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 4349

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

USMISSION UN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

USDOCOUTH PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 4706

LIMDIS

7. PECK AGREED SAYING HE HAD PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS FROM RCO THAT HMG FAVORS LONG, COOL, UNHURRIED LOOK AT KARAMANLIS LETTER AND THE MANY, MANY QUESTIONS IT RAISES.

8. DE ROSE ON PERSONAL BASIS AGREED WITH RUMSFELD'S ANALYSIS AND HIS SUGGESTION. HE EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT, FOR REASONS ALREADY STATED, IT WAS MOST LIKELY THAT SUBSTANCE OF KARAMANLIS LETTER WILL COME TO PUBLIC ATTENTION. EACH ALLIED GOVERNMENT WILL IN DUE COURSE UNDOUBTEDLY RESPOND TO GREEK PM. WHILE GOF'S REPLY CANNOT FOR HISTORICAL REASONS EXACTLY PARALLEL THAT FROM US, UK OR FRG, ALLIES CAN BE CERTAIN THAT GOG WILL RECEIVE NO ENCOURAGEMENT WHATEVER.

9. KRAPF REMARKED THAT KARAMANLIS LETTER IS POORLY DRAFTED, PERHAPS DELIBERATELY SO. FRG MAINTAINS POLICY OF PLAYING IT COOL AND ALLOWING AMPLE TIME FOR DISCUSSION. MAIN SECRET

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INFLUENCE ALLIES CAN EXERT ON ATHENS NOW IS THROUGH BILATERAL CHANNELS. HE WONDERED HOW GREECE PLANS TO ATTEND TO ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE INDEPENDENTLY, AS STATED IN PARA. 5 OF KARAMANLIS LETTER, WHEN IT HAS LONG PLEADED WITH ITS ALLIES FOR FOREIGN MILITARY AID. THEREFORE, ONE COULD SEE A NEED FOR THOROUGH AND SOBER DISCUSSION OF CURRENT EAST/WEST BALANCE WITH SENIOR GREEK OFFICIALS AT PROPER TIME. KRAPF ALSO EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT FRANCE IN ITS REPLY AND IN BILATERAL CONTACTS COULD PLAY MOST USEFUL ROLE BY CONTRASTING FRENCH AND GREEK SITUATIONS.

10. RUMSFELD URGED THAT INTERNATIONAL STAFF ANALYZE POINTS KRAPF AND OTHERS HAD MADE. HE SUGGESTED THAT ALLIES PROVIDE IS WITH ANALYTICAL INPUTS FROM CAPITALS SO THAT, WITHOUT COORDINATING REPLIES, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT COULD DRAW ON COMMON POOL OF IDEAS WHEN TIME CAME FOR DRAFTING INDIVIDUAL RESPONSES. RUMSFELD TOO EMPHASIZED ROLE THAT FRANCE MIGHT PLAY IN ITS NATIONAL INTEREST AND IN LARGER INTEREST OF ALLIANCE WHEN RESPONDING TO KARAMANLIS LETTER AND IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH GOG; AND, AS EC-9 CHAIRMAN, FRENCH ROLE ESPECIALLY EUROPEAN.

11. BAL SAID GOB INTENDS TO MOVE WITH PRUDENCE SINCE THERE IS NO NEED FOR HASTE AND CERTAINLY NO NEED TO CLARIFY AMBIGUITIES IN KARAMANLIS LETTER. PECK VENTURED OPINION THAT GOG ANXIOUS TO REASSERT ITS CLAIM TO POSSIBLE OIL ON CONTINENTAL SHELF AND THUS RALLY MORE POPULAR SUPPORT.

12. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION PANSA INSTRUCTED KILLHAM (IS) TO INITIATE STUDIES. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT NEITHER A NAC MEETING, NOR A PERMREP MEETING AT 13, NOR A POLAD MEETING AT 13 WOULD BE USEFUL UNTIL IS HAD COMPLETED INITIAL STUDIES. IF, AS THOUGHT LIKELY, EXISTENCE OF KARAMANLIS LETTER BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, NATO STUDIES WILL IN FACT BE IN PROGRESS. PANSA SAID HE PLANNED FURNISH COPY OF KARAMANLIS LETTER TO CHAIRMAN OF NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE WITH INJUNCTION TO DO NOTHING. RUMSFELD

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**To:** STATE  
SECDEF  
ALL NATO CAPITALS  
GENEVA  
UN  
NICOSIA  
USNMR SHAPE

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